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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID L. HANSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 990856-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error, or caused Hansen to suffer 
a manifest injustice, in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defenses to theft set 
forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-402? To obtain appellate relief, Stanley must 
show: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
(hi) the error is harmful. . . . " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
2. Whether Hansen was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel? 
"Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court can 
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only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do 
so as a matter of law.. .If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, but prejudice 
cannot be determined on the record before us, remand is appropriate." State v. Snyder. 
860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 
App. 1993). To establish ineffective counsel Stanley must show: ff(l) that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
Strickland V.Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); 
State v. Hunt. 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
David L. Hansen appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding after he was convicted by a jury of Theft of a Motor 
Vehicle, a second degree felony. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
David L. Hansen was charged by information filed in Fourth Circuit Court, 
Provo Department, on August 12, 1994, with Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-404, 412 (R. 3). 
On February 13, 1995, a preliminary hearing was held before Judge Steven L. 
Hansen at which time Hansen was bound over to Fourth District Court for trial on the 
charge upon a finding of probable cause (R. 19-20). 
On July 5, 1995, a jury trial was held with Judge Ray M. Harding presiding and 
Hansen was found by the jury to be "guilty" of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second 
degree felony (R. 177, 178-180, 249). 
On August 18, 1995, Hansen was sentenced to 1-15 years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 183-84, 250). After sentencing, Hansen sought to stay the time to file an 
appeal pending resolution of the issue of restitution (R. 188). The trial court granted 
his motion (R. 190). On October 18, 1995, a restitution hearing was held and Hansen 
was ordered to pay $750 in restitution (R. 193, 251, 194-95, 202-03). After the 
restitution issue was resolved, Hansen appealed (R. 198-99) (Case No. 950785-CA). 
However, Hansen's appeal was dismissed because this Court found it lacked 
jurisdiction (R. 215). Hansen subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
(R. 220-29). The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Hansen on September 
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1, 1999 (R. 239). A Notice of Appeal was filed in Fourth District Court on September 
30, 1999, and this action commenced (R. 242). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Bethany Westwood 
Bethany Westwood testified that Hansen contacted her by telephone in April of 
1994 and asked if he could do some work at the house that Westwood's son, Kevin 
Edwards, lives in for a couple of days and Westwood agreed (R. 249 at 44). At the 
time Westwood and Edwards owned a 1971 GMC truck (R. 249 at 45). Westwood 
testified that she gave the truck to Edwards, but that when he borrowed money to have 
the truck fixed, he added her name to the car's title by notorized signature (R. 249 at 
47-48, 51-53). 
B. Testimony of Kevin Edwards 
Kevin Edwards testified that he lived in Provo at 355 South 600 West in a house 
owned by his mother (R. 249 at 54). In April of 1994, Edwards had a 1971 GMC 
truck (R. 249 at 55). Edwards testified that he kept the truck title in the glove 
compartment (R. 249 at 57). Although Edwards testified that he did not routinely keep 
vehicle titles in the glove box (R. 249 at 64). 
Edwards testified that on April 6, 1994, Hansen was staying at his house and 
doing some work to earn money (R. 249 at 57). That evening, Hansen borrowed the 
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truck to go to Salt Lake City (R. 249 at 58). Hansen took Edwards' dog with him 
(Id.). Edwards testified that he told Hansen that he wanted Hansen to return in a few 
hours (R. 249 at 58). 
Edwards testified that he never knowingly transferred the title of the truck to 
Hansen, that he never intended to sell Hansen the truck, and that Hansen never paid 
him any money for the truck (R. 249 at 60). Hansen did not return with the truck or 
the dog nor did he contact Edwards until after he was arrested by the police (R. 249 at 
60). 
Edwards admitting to consuming alcohol on April 6, 1994--"a few highballs" 
(R. 249 at 62). 
Two days after Hansen went to work at the house, Edwards called Westwood 
and told her that Hansen had borrowed the truck and had not returned it (R. 249 at 46). 
Westwood called the police (Id.). 
C. Testimony of Charlie Peterson 
Charlie Peterson testified that on April 6, 1994, he was going to an AA meeting 
and stopped at Edwards' house in Provo (R. 249 at 69-70). Peterson asked Edwards if 
he wanted to go and Edwards agreed (R. 249 at 70). Peterson testified that he 
"gathered that Kevin and David were going to go to Salt Lake to the bar, and then 
Kevin decided to go with me. And it sounded to me like Kevin~not Kevin, but David 
was going to use the truck, and then he was going to be back later that evening" (R. 
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249 at 70-71). Peterson testified that Edwards agreed that Hansen could take die dog 
with him (R. 249 at 71). Peterson testified that Edwards had been drinking that 
evening but that he did not appear to be intoxicated (R. 249 at 72). 
D. Testimony of Tim Meyer 
Tim Meyer, a Provo City police officer, testified that in April of 1994 he was 
contacted by Edwards and Westwood about the theft of a 1971 GMC truck (R. 249 at 
78). Meyer testified that he conducted an investigation and eventually found the truck 
in the possession of a Jerry Dawson in Montana (R. 249 at 79). 
E. Testimony of Jerry Dawson 
Jerry Dawson testified mat he is a resident of Montana who met Hansen in July 
of 1994 (R. 249 at 87-88). Dawson 's business is located in the same building as an 
automotive center (R. 249 at 88). Dawson had been looking for a used engine when 
Hansen came into the auto center and indicated that he had an engine for sale (R. 249 at 
88). Dawson testified that Hansen told him that the motor was in a wrecked truck at a 
wrecking yard and that he could look at it (Id.). Hansen also told Dawson that he had 
rolled the truck in an accident (Id.). According to Dawson, the truck-except for the 
engine-was demolished (R. 249 at 89). Dawson paid Hansen $425 for the engine, 
which was in good shape (R. 249 at 89, 96). Dawson testified that he never asked 
about ownership of the truck nor was he ever shown the vehicle's title (R. 249 at 91). 
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f
 j:-H;>ximately four months after removing the engine from the tr nek, Dausoi
 # found 
iiic i..ic ;i: the i.ijve DOX of the ti uck cab (R 249 at 95) 
Ii II mi si II I  I  I  iiiri nil1 David 1 Ilmiscii 
David Hansen testified that in early April of 1994 he called Edwards at Ms 
iiiO'tlier's house for a ride from,, Orein to Provo (R. 249 at 98). Edwards came and 
picked up Hansen and the> virove to Edward." s house (Id Ii I i h . u d s and Hansen drank 
logeiiief iiii'II IIIMH I'll ilia! • ; • i iln nit'lil 11< /" il" JI ^MI Hansen 
slept on Edwards' couch (Id 
Edwards told Hansen dial he ha.! car in impound arid thai he was iy
 0 .» 
raise money fo ?cf ; t ™if ( . • r o n testiiKu \\u& IK ,U. ,IOI hdve a ve!^-1-
iic made an diiuiigemciit witii Edwards LU purchase die truck ioi ^proximate i 
which was the amount of money Hansen had (R. 249 at 100) 
I lansen testified that, he had, never privately purcnasnj a \ uuc i t odore (R.249 at 
IKJ diw iruck whiUi he had ict i ie .ed iiviLx ins bedroom (k. 249 ai i u i - ^ . 
Afterwards, Hansen and Edwards continued to drink until Edwards got invited, to 
go to an, A A meeting (i(, 249 ;ii III m Hansen Ihcn leil |K, 249 al II IJ!| l i a r — 
testilinl thsil n'hnii lie lllrlt h h ' i i d 1 . ' dn}1 >s i in ilum llkii I-, yiiiil I V } | M , i l III11 III) 
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Approximately 7-10 days later, Hansen testified thai he drove the truck to 
Montana where he would be working for his brother (R. 249 at 102). Hansen testified 
that he planned to register the vehicle in Montana, but he got in an accident in which 
the truck was totaled and Hansen broke his back (R. 249 al 103). 
Hansen testified that after he got out of the hospital, he sold the truck's engine to 
Dawson (R. 249 at 103). 
Hansen testified that he believed that he was the owner of the truck (R. 249 at 
104). Hansen indicated that he "thought all I had to do was send it in to the new-
where I was going to get it registered, send the title in, get the title in the other state 
and registration in that state" (R. 249 at 104). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hansen asserts that the trial court committed an obvious and harmful error in 
failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defenses to theft set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-402(3). Furthermore, Hansen was deprived the effective assistance 
of counsel because of trial counsel's failure to argue or assert an affirmative defense 




! ! ' OJUKT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROi 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO THEFT 
Hansen asserts that the :i i' court erred in its failure 10 instruct tiiw ir> ,n iliw 
affirmative ucic.,.^ ,.. im »•';; ..-« of theft set fr-rtv :~ TT"l-1" Code Annotated t "''-<'• 
.ij. ..i.s omissKi. ..:: >1niirtm,T' 
nonetheless, review this issue under Ifnli: l(>lr ' . le,s ol ('ninmal 
:edure in order "to avoid a manifest injustice, ice State v. Verde. 7 ,\> i' 
, I hi ill 1989); and State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme 
. Lye * . una .amiest injustice" arid determined that " i n 
must circumstances, the icim ukunh m\ irntiifi villi ilit," 'plsiin aim'" 
slaiid.n 1," 773 P.2d at • 21 ~L Therefore, _j u-iain appellate relief for die trial court's 
failure to instruct the jury, Hansen must show; "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should 
luivi Uvi f \%l i< i '"it iiiui1 * "mil mi In m m i, Un nili ' "' State v. Dunn. 850 
P.2dl201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-402(3) sets forth 'the affirmative defenses to "the 
offense of theft: 
ie actor: 
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(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or 
service involved; or 
(b) Acted under an honest belief that he had the right to obtain 
or exercie control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
Hansen asserts that under the facts of this case, the jury should have been instructed on 
these affirmative defenses-particularly subsection (a) and/or (b). Moreover, Hansen 
asserts that under the facts of this case, it was obvious and harmful error for the trial 
court not to so instruct the jury-error which caused Hansen to suffer a manifest 
injustice. 
According to Hansen's testimony, he bought the truck from Edwards for $650 
approximately 7-10 days before leaving for Montana (R. 249 at 99-102). Even 
Edwards acknowledged that Hansen had permission to take the truck (R. 249 at 58). 
Moreover, according to Hansen, Edwards retrieved the title to the truck from the 
bedroom (R. 249 at 101-02), which is more consistent wiith Westwood's testimony that 
she believed that the title was in a bedroom than was Edwards' testimony that he kept 
the title in the truck's glove box (R. 249 at 57). 
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Hansen asserts that the jury should have been instructed that it was a defense to 
the offense of theft if he "acted under an honest claim of right to the property" or if he 
"acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the 
property". The evidence presented at trial clearly established such a defense. The trial 
court's failure to so instruct the jury was not only obvious error but it was also harmful 
because it robbed Hansen of a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. See, 
State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah App. 1998) and State v. Cude. 383 P.2d 
399, 401 (Utah 1963) (If at the time of the taking of the property by the defendant, he 
in.good faith believed said property was his, or if the jury had reasonable doubt to that 
effect, then he should be acquitted). 
Accordingly, Hansen requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand 
the case back to the Fourth District for new proceedings because of the manifest 
injustice which Hansen suffered because of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury 
as to the affirmative defenses to theft. 
POINT II 
HANSEN WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Typically, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised concurrently with 
an allegation of plain error because if the error was plain to the court, it should also 
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have been plain to trial counsel. See, Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1208-09, 1225-29 (Utah 
1993); and State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 826 (Utah App. 1994). 
As a result, this Court should conclude as a matter of law that, based upon the 
obvious and harmful failure of trial counsel to request that the jury be instructed as to 
the affirmative defenses to theft, Hansen was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
See State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993) ("Where the ineffective 
assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court can only determine that the 
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do so as a matter of 
law."). 
In determining whether Hansen was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
"this court cannot apply rigid mechanical rules, but instead must focus Non the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.'" Strickland 
v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2056 (1984); State v. Snyder. 860 
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). 
In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to show: 
(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
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and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error." State v. Hunt. 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
To satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Hansen must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness, but the court is not to 
second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 
104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennyson. 850 p.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993); Crestani. 
707 P.2d at 1089. It should have been obvious to counsel-as well as the court-that the 
evidence produced at trial created more than a reasonable likelihood of an affrimative 
defense under § 76-6-402(3). Therefore, counsel should have requested that the jury be 
instructed as to the defenses. Likewise, counsel had an obligation to present and argue 
a defense to the charge. His failure to argue the statutory defenses set forth in the Utah 
Code robbed Hansen of competent representation. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability has been described as 
"a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See Strickland. 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. "The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result." Crestani. 771 P.2d at 1092. In this particular case the 
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adversarial process cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Had counsel 
done his homework with respect to the facts of the case and the available defenses 
under § 76-6-402(3), then the jury would have been instructed as to the statutory 
defenses to theft and Hansen would have had a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate Stanley fs convictions on grounds that 
"counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Hansen asks that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the matter to 
Fourth District Court because the trial court committed obvious and harmful error, and 
trial counsel rendered deficient and prejudicial representation, in their failure to instruct 
the jury as to the affirmative defenses to theft set forth in the Utah Code. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/^i day of April, 2000. 
/hiwi/f 'Tii* 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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#0-0-^U^6 CRIMINAL CODE 2 
estate, tangible and intangible personal property, cap-
tured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments 
or other writings representing or embodying rights con-
cerning real or personal property, labor, services, or Oth-
erwise containing anything of value to the owner, com-
modities of a public utility nature such as 
telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any 
scientific or technical information, design, process, proce-
dure, formula or invention which the owner thereof in-
tends to be available only to persons selected by him, 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring 
about a transfer of possession or of some other legally 
recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or 
another; in relation to labor or services, to secure perfor-
mance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make 
any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
object: 
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances 
that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of 
the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) lb restore the property only upon payment of a 
reward or other compensation; or 
(c) Tb dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized contror me^ns, 
but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore de-
fined or known as common-law larceny by trespas^ory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
that the actor previously created or confirmed by 
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to 
be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information 
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers prop-
erty without disclosing a lien, sjecurity interest, ad-
verse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoy-
ment of the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is 
or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not intend to perfonfl or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that 
failure to perform the prjomise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof 
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in pos-
session stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an 
interest in the property or service stolen if another person 
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to 
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of 
this subsection shall not include a security interest for t 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to t 
property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the rip 
to obtain or exercise control over the property 
service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the proper 
or service honestly believing that the owner 
present, would have consented. 'Xi 
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a sim 
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heret 
fore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailee 
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receivu 
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported 1 
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified i 
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the power < 
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance c 
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defenfc 
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise, \ft 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unautbc 
rized control over the property of another with a purpose t 
deprive him thereof. \# 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises contfo 
over property of another by deception and with a purpose tc 
deprive him thereof. 
Q) Tneftby deception does not occur, Viowever, when foien 
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance 
or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary person* 
in the group addressed. "Puffing'' means an exaggeratec 
commendation of wares or worth in communications ad 
dressed to the public or to a class or group. tfW 
76-6-406. Theft by extortion. 
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercis* 
control over the property of another by extortion and with • 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs when a person 
threatens to: 
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to the person 
threatened or to any other person or to property at any 
time; or 
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person 
to physical confinement or restraint; or **# 
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; at 
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or 
(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed V 
the person threatened; or 
(f) Testify or provide information or withhold 
mony or information with respect to another's legal claJBV 
or defense; or ym 
(g) Take action as an official agaiix&t anyone or aflt 
thing, or withhold official action, or cause such action °6 
withholding; or 
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or oil 
similar collective action to obtain property which is 1 ^  
demanded or received for the benefit of the group w ^ ^ 
the actor purports to represent; or 38| 
(i) Do any other act which would not in itself subst^ 
tially benefit him but which would harm substantialv| 
any other person with respect to that person's neaJ*J|L 
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, re$£| 
tation, or personal relationships. l^ 
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(4) "Telecommunication device" means: 
(a) any type of instrument, device, machine, or 
equipment which is capable of transmitting or receiv-
ing telephonic, electronic, or radio communications; 
or 
(b) any part of an instrument, device, machine, or 
equipment, or other computer circuit, computer chip, 
electronic mechanism, or other component, which is 
capable of facilitating the transmission or reception 
of telephonic or electronic communications within the 
radio spectrum allocated to cellular radio telephony. 
(5) "Telecommunication service" includes any service 
provided for a charge or compensation to facilitate the 
origination, transmission, emission, or reception of signs, 
signals, writings, images, and sounds or intelligence of 
any nature by telephone, including cellular telephones, 
wire, radio, television optical or other electromagnetic 
system. 
(6) "Telecommunication service provider" means any 
person or entity providing telecommunication service in-
cluding a cellular telephone or paging company or other 
person or entity which, for a fee, supplies the facility, cell 
site, mobile telephone switching office, or other equipment 
or telecommunication service. 
(7) "Unlawful telecommunication device" means any 
telecommunication device that is capable of, or has been 
altered, modified, programmed, or reprogrammed, alone 
or in conjunction with another access device, so as to be 
capable of, acquiring or facilitating the acquisition of a 
telecommunication service without the consent of the 
telecommunication service provider. Unlawful devices in-
clude tumbler phones, counterfeit phones, tumbler micro-
chips, counterfeit microchips, and other instruments ca-
pable of disguising their identity or location or of gaining 
access to a communications system operated by a telecom-
munication service provider. 1994 
76-6-409.6. U s e of t e lecommunicat ion device to avo id 
lawful charge for serv ice — Penalty. 
(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with 
the intent to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for 
telecommunication service or with the knowledge that it was 
to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for telecommuni-
cation service is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecom-
munication service is less than $300 or cannot be ascer-
tained; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor, if the value of the telecom-
munication service charge is or exceeds $300 but is not 
more than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommu-
nication service is or exceeds $1,000 but is not more than 
$5,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecom-
munication service is or exceeds $5,000. 
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an 
offense under this section shall be guilty of a second degree 
felony upon a second conviction and any subsequent convic-
tion. 1995 
76-6-409.7. Possession of any unlawful telecommuni-
cation device — Penalty. 
%(1) Any person who knowingly possesses an unlawful tele-
communication device shall be guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. 
(2) If any person knowingly possesses five or more unlawful 
telecommunication devices in the same criminal episode, he 
•tall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1994 
76-6-409.8. Sale of an unlawful telecommunication de-
vice — Penalty. 
, • ft) Any person shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor who 
^tentionally sells an unlawful telecommunication device or 
material, including hardware, data, computer software, or 
other information or equipment, knowing that the purchaser 
or a third person intends to use such material in the manu-
facture of an unlawful telecommunication device. 
(2) If the offense under this section involves the intentional 
sale of five or more unlawful telecommunication devices 
within a six-month period, the person committing the offense 
shall be guilty of a third degree felony. 1994 
76-6-409.9. Manufacture of a n unlawful te lecommuni-
cation device — Penalty. 
(1) Any person who intentionally manufactures an unlaw-
ful telecommunication device shall be guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(2) If the offense under this section involves the intentional 
manufacture of five or more unlawful telecommunication 
devices within a six-month period, the person committing the 
offense shall be guilty of a third degree felony. 1994 
76-6-409.10. P a y m e n t of res t i tut ion — Civil act ion —-
Other remedies retained. 
(1) A person who violates Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-
6-409.9 shall make restitution to the telecommunication ser-
vice provider for the value of the telecommunication service 
consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable 
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this 
section. Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and 
costs for investigation, service calls, employee time, and 
equipment use. 
(2) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect 
the right of a telecommunication service provider to bring a 
civil action for red cess for damages suffered as a result of the 
commission of any of the acts prohibited by this section. 
(3) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, 
action, or remedy otherwise available to a telecommunication 
service provider. 1996 
76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of property 
pursuant to repair or rental agreement. 
A person is guilty of theft if: 
(1) Having custody of property pursuant to an agree-
ment between himself or another and the owner thereof 
whereby the actor or another is to perform for compensa-
tion a specific service for the owner involving the mainte-
nance, repair, or use of such property, he intentionally 
uses or operates it, without the consent of the owner, for 
his own purposes in a manner constituting a gross devia-
tion from the agreed purpose; or 
(2) Having custody of any property pursuant to a rental 
or lease agreement where it is to be returned in a specified 
manner or at a specified time, intentionally fails to comply 
with the terms of the agreement concerning return so as 
to render such failure a gross deviation from the agree-
ment. 1973 
76-6-411. Repea led . 1974 
76-6-412. Theft — Classif ication of offenses — Action 
for t reb le d a m a g e s aga ins t receiver of s to len 
properly. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds 
$5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable 
motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the 
time of the theft; or 
(iv) proj>erty is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
